What Is Knowledge?

THE PROBLEM OF THE THEAETETUS

If you know that it is raining, then it *is* raining and you *believe* that it is raining. The point may be generalized by saying that, if you have knowledge, then you have true belief. But knowledge is more than mere true belief. For your belief that it is raining could be true even if you didn't *know* that it is raining. Perhaps you have simply made a lucky guess. What, then, must be *added* to true belief to get knowledge? Finding the answer to this question is sometimes called, "the problem of the *Theaetetus*," since the question was first clearly formulated by Plato in his dialogue of that name.

The traditional or classic answer—and the one proposed in Plato's dialogue, the *Theaetetus*—is that knowledge is *justified* true belief. The relevant sense of "justified" is the one we have expressed by means of the term "evident"; knowledge is *evident* true belief. According to this conception of knowledge, three conditions must obtain if a person knows a proposition to be true. First, the proposition is true; secondly, the person accepts it; and, thirdly, the proposition is one that is evident for that person.[1] Hence the classical definition of knowledge may be put this way:

S knows that h is true = Df   h is true; S accepts h; and h is evident for S.

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[1]Some philosophers have suggested that a proposition might be known without being accepted. For criticisms of this suggestion, see Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974), Chapter 3, and D. W. Armstrong, *Belief, Truth and Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 137–149.

THE GETTIER PROBLEM

We have seen that a belief may be both evident and *false*. In countenancing the possibility that a proposition *e* may *inductively,* or *nondemonstratively*, confer evidence upon a proposition *h*, we have also countenanced the possibility that in such a case *e* is true and *h* is false. This means that, for all we know, some of the propositions that are evident to us are also false. But if this is possible, then the traditional definition must be modified.

This problem for the traditional definition of knowledge was first noted by Edmund L. Gettier in a paper entitled "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" published in 1963.[2] The problem has since become known, appropriately, as, "the Gettier problem." It is also called, "the problem of the fourth condition," since it leads one to ask, "Is there some suitable fourth condition which may be added to the three that are set forth in the traditional definition of knowledge?"

Gettier noted that the following situation, among others, is counter to the traditional definition of knowledge:

Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:

(f)   Jones owns a Ford.

Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place names quite at random, and constructs the following three propositions:

(g)   Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston;

(h)   Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;

(i)   Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.

Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realized the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (f), and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.

But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does *not* own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does *not* know that (h) is true, even though (*i*) (h) is true, (*ii*) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (*iii*) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.[3]

[2]Edmund L. Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" *Analysis*, Vol. 23 (1963), pp. 121–123.

[3]*Op. cit.*, pp. 122–123.

Gettier concludes, therefore, that the traditional definition of knowledge does not give us a *sufficient* reason for saying that someone knows a given proposition to be true. The person Smith and the proposition (h) of Gettier's example satisfy the conditions of the traditional definition. For (1) the proposition that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona is true, (2) Smith accepts the proposition that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona, and (3) it is evident for Smith that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. But it is clear that, in the situation Gettier describes, Smith does not *know* that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

Gettier was the first philosopher to see that the traditional definition of knowledge is thus inadequate. Since the publication of his now classic paper in 1963, many other counter-examples to the traditional definition have been formulated, most of them not different in principle from the one just cited.

Once Gettier had pointed out the inadequacy of the traditional definition, it became apparent that certain other cases which had puzzled earlier philosophers could also have been used to show that the traditional definition requires modification. We will mention two of these: one suggested by A. Meinong in 1906, the other by Bertrand Russell in 1948.

Meinong considers an Austrian garden where there is an Aeolian harp made to whistle in the wind and thereby keep the birds away. "Assume now," he says, "that someone who has lived in the vicinity of such an apparatus has become hard of hearing in the course of time and has developed a tendency to have auditory hallucinations. It could easily happen that he hallucinates the familiar sounds of the Aeolian harp at the very moment at which these sounds are actually to be heard."[4] If this were to happen, then, given the theory of perception set forth in the present work, one might say that the man had a true and evident belief to the effect that the harp was then sounding. But it hardly would be true to say that he thereby *knew* that the harp was then sounding.

Russell wrote:

It is very easy to give examples of true beliefs that are not knowledge. There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, though he thinks it is, and who happens to look at it the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true belief as to the time of day, but cannot be said to have knowledge. There is the man who believes, truly, that the last name of the Prime Minister in 1906 began with a B, but who believes this because he thinks that Balfour was Prime Minister then, whereas it was Campbell Bannerman.[5]

[4]A. Meinong, *Über die Erfahrungsgrundlagen unseres Wissens* (1906). Meinong constructs cites another example, involving a man who is disturbed by a ringing in his ears at a time when, as luck would have it, someone happens to be ringing the doorbell. The two examples may be found in Volume V of the Meinong *Gesamtausgabe* (Graz: Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, 1973), pp. 398-399, 619.

[5]Bertrand Russell, *Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1948), p. 155.

(Russell's second man may be compared with those supporters of George McGovern who believed, in 1972, that Nixon's successor would be a man whose first name began with "G.") If we add, in these cases, that the true propositions in question are also evident, then these cases are counter to the traditional definition of knowledge.

Consider a slightly different example. A person *takes* there to be a sheep in the field and does so under conditions which are such that, when under those conditions a person takes there to be a sheep in the field, then it is *evident* for that person that there is a sheep in the field. The person, however, has mistaken a dog for a sheep and so what he sees is not a sheep at all. Nevertheless it happens that there *is* a sheep in another part of the field. Hence, the proposition that there is a sheep in the field will be one that is both true and evident and it will also be one that the person accepts. But the situation does not warrant our saying that the person *knows* that there is a sheep in the field.

A NOTE OF CAUTION

Many of the examples that have been discussed in connection with the Gettier problem would seem *not* to be cases where the evidence justifies something false. One of the clearest and most influential of such examples was proposed by Alvin Goldman. Suppose, he suggests, that Henry is driving through the countryside and sees a barn a few feet away. It looks just as one would expect a barn to look. And so Henry has no reason to question his senses. He would seem to be justified in the true belief that there *is* a barn that he sees. But suppose further that

unknown to Henry, the district he has entered is full of papier-mâché facsimiles of barns. These facsimiles look from the road exactly like barns, but are really just facades, without back walls or interiors, quite incapable of being used as barns. Having just entered the district, Henry has not encountered any facsimiles; the object he sees is a genuine barn. But if the object on that site were a facsimile, Henry would mistake it for a barn.[6]

Henry, it would seem clear, has *justified true belief* that it is a barn that he sees, and yet he cannot be said to *know* that he sees a barn. And his evidence, we may assume, is not defective: it does not justify him in any *false* belief.

There is a serious problem with this example. Henry's true belief that he sees a barn, although it is a *justified* true belief, is not an *evident* true belief. His evidence may make it *probable* for him—indeed, his evidence may even make it *beyond reasonable doubt* for him—that he sees a barn. But nothing makes if *evident* for him that he sees a barn. For such a thing to be evident

for him, as we have seen in discussing the evidence of the senses, Henry would need to have far more evidence then he now has. And if it is not evident to Henry that he sees a barn or that there is a barn there, then Henry does not *know* that he sees a barn or that there is a barn there.

The example makes clear, once again, the importance of distinguishing *levels* of epistemic justification.[7] And it reminds us, once again, that *justified* true belief need not be the *evident* true belief that is required by the concept of knowing.[8]

A CLOSER LOOK AT THE EXAMPLE

What may be said about Gettier's original example may also be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the other examples. In discussing how to deal with the problem, therefore, let us restrict ourselves to the original example.

At first consideration, the problem may seem easy to solve. But the easy answers will not work. Let us consider four such answers.

(1) The true proposition—"Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona"—that constitutes a counter-example to the traditional definition of knowledge, is a proposition for which Smith has only inductive or non-demonstrative evidence. It is made evident for him by propositions that do not entail it. One may be tempted to say, therefore, that no such proposition can be known to be true. But, as we have seen, unless the things we can know are restricted to what is self-presenting or *a priori*, we must face the possibility that some of the things we know have only inductive, or non-demonstrative, evidence.

We will assume, then, that we do know such propositions as that expressed by, "Jones owns a Ford." And we will also assume that the kind of evidence we have for such propositions does not significantly differ in content from the kind of evidence that Gettier described.[9]

(2) The evidence *e* that Smith has for *h* (Jones owns a Ford or Smith is in

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[7]Compare Robert Audi, "Defeated Knowledge, Reliability, and Justification," *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. V (1980), pp. 75–96.

[8]In considering the example, one may be impressed by the epistemic distinction between the proposition (h), "Jones owns a Ford," and that proposition (i), "Jones keeps a Ford in his garage . . . " which makes h evident for Jones. The latter proposition is not *certain* for Jones and yet one has the feeling that it is of a higher epistemic order from Smith than the *evident* proposition that Jones owns a Ford. Our theory of epistemic categories may be said to confirm this feeling, since we have noted that the *obvious* falls between the certain and the evident.

[9]Actually the evidence e that Gettier cites ("Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's memory owned a car and always a Ford and Jones has just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford") is not itself sufficient to make f evident for Smith. At most, they justify f only in the weaker sense of making h beyond reasonable doubt. In discussing the example, therefore, we will imagine that Smith's evidence e contains still other propositions (e.g., "Jones keeps a Ford in his garage," along with other such propositions) and that the whole conjunction of propositions does make f evident for Smith.

Barcelona) confers evidence upon the *false* proposition *f* (Jones owns a Ford). This fact has suggested to many that Gettier's problem may be dealt with in a very simple way: we have only to stipulate—they suppose—that if one is to have knowledge, then the evidence that one has must not confer evidence upon anything that is false. Such a stipulation would rule out too much. For Smith's evidence *e* is itself a proposition that he knows to be true and *e* makes *f* evident for him. Hence the proposed solution would require us to say, incorrectly, that Smith does not know *e* to be true.

We must, therefore, reconcile ourselves to the fact that a proposition *can* be known even though what confers evidence upon that proposition also confers evidence upon a proposition that is false.

(3) Gettier's Smith was lucky in the proposition that he had hit upon, "Either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona." This leads Alvin Goldman to observe, "One thing that seems to be missing in this example is a causal connection between the fact that makes *p* true [or simply, the fact that *p*] and S's belief that p."[10] Hence the following possibility suggests itself: we say that if a proposition is known, then the fact that the proposition is true is *causally connected* with the fact that the proposition is believed. But let us look at the suggestion more closely.

As we have seen in discussing "externalism," it is not easy to single out any one event as being *the* cause of a given occurrence. This is especially difficult when the occurrence is the acquisition of a belief. Normally the most that we can say is that this and that *contribute causally* to one's having the belief. Returning to Gettier's example, let us consider someone—say, Brown himself—who *does* know that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. There is no clear sense in which that disjunctive fact could be said to be *the* cause of Brown's having a belief that is directed upon it. And, indeed, it is problematic whether the disjunctive fact—as distinguished from the fact that Brown is in Barcelona—could even be said to *contribute causally* to Brown's belief.

"It is essential to Gettier's example, however, that Brown being in Barcelona does not even *contribute* causally to Smith having the belief that he has." Actually that is *not* essential to Gettier's example. Suppose that among the things that contributed causally to Smith's thinking of Barcelona and not, say, of Bratislava was the fact that he had overheard Robinson asking Miller whether Barcelona was in Spain. Suppose further that, among the things that contributed causally to Robinson's question, was the fact that, wholly unknown to Smith, Brown's wife has told Robinson that the weather is now ideal in Barcelona. And suppose, finally, that among the things contributing to her saying *that* was the fact that her husband has told her as much on the telephone. Such a causal connection between Smith's belief

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[10]Alvin Goldman, "A Causal Theory of Knowing," George S. Pappas and Marshall Swain, eds., *Essays on Knowledge and Justification* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978), pp. 67–86; the quotation is on page 68.

and Brown's being in Barcelona would not entitle us to say that Smith *knows* that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.

(4) One may be tempted to say, "Smith *would* have had the belief he had even if Brown had *not* been in Barcelona." And this counterfactual conditional suggests that there may be another way of dealing with the problem. Shall we consider saying that, in the case of knowledge, the proposition believed is one such that, if it had been *false*, then the person would *not* have accepted it? Robert Nozick has proposed such a counterfactual definition. According to him, "S knows that h," might be explicated in the following way, "S accepts h; h is true; and in arriving at his belief, S followed a method which is such that, if h had been false and S had followed that method, then S would not have accepted h."[11] Unfortunately, however, definition by means of counterfactual conditionals is somewhat risky, since such definitions are fairly easily brought down by means of examples which are themselves counterfactual.

The hope is to formulate a counterfactual definition of knowledge which is such that, in application to Gettier's example, it will *not* require us to say of Smith that he *knows* that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. In application to this case, Nozick's proposal is essentially this:

S knows that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona = Df
(1) S accepts the proposition that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona; (2) the proposition in question is true; and (3) in arriving at his belief, S followed a method which is that, if the proposition had been false and S had followed that method, then S would not have accepted that proposition.

How is such a definition to be evaluated?

In testing a definition, we ask whether there are any possible circumstances under which the first part (the definiendum) would be true and the second part (the definiens) false; and we ask whether there are any possible circumstances under which the first part would be false and the second part true. Somewhat more exactly, we look for circumstances which are logically' independent of each of the two parts of the definition and which are such that, under those circumstances, the one part of the definition would be true and the other part false. If we find no such circumstances, then we may hope, at least, that there are no such circumstances. But if we do find such a circumstance, then we will know that the definition is inadequate.

Let us look again at the definition proposed above. Are there any possible circumstances under which the three conditions of the definiens would be satisfied and S would *not* know that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona? Clearly there are many such possible circumstances.

[11]See Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1981), pp. 178–180. Nozick's definition is more complex than the one that I have formulated, but the added complexity does not affect the point that is here made.

One would be this: Smith is such that, if he had followed the method in question and Jones had not owned a Ford, then he, Smith, would have believed that Jones does not exist. Another would be this: if Smith had followed the method in question and Jones had not owned a Ford, then Smith would no longer have *any* beliefs. It is logically possible that such things *could* happen. And we could hardly say, in such cases, that Smith *knows* that either Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona. And therefore the proposed counterfactual definition is inadequate.

Some philosophers, after reflection upon this problem, have despaired of providing any definition of knowledge at all and have suggested that perhaps the best we can do is merely to formulate certain necessary conditions of certain types of knowledge. But let us try to repair the traditional definition of knowledge.

A DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE

Many different repairs have been suggested, but unfortunately there is no consensus as to whether any of them has been successful. Some of them are very difficult to understand, for they go considerably beyond the store of concepts we have permitted ourselves in the present work.[12] We will not attempt to evaluate the various suggestions that have been made, but will, simply ask whether the traditional definition can be repaired within the general scheme of concepts that we have been using.

Let us say that a "Gettier case" is a situation of this sort: there is a person who accepts a true proposition that is evident for him and the proposition is *not* one that he knows to be true. Let us now consider certain facts about the propositions that are thus involved in Gettier cases.

The propositions involved in Gettier cases are all such that they are made evident by *other* propositions. As we have seen, the relation of *making evident* is inductive, or nondemonstrative. This means that, if one proposition makes another evident, then the first proposition does not logically entail

[12]Among the more important earlier discussions of Gettier's article are: Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson, "Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXVI (1969), 225–237; Fred Dretske, "Conclusive Reasons, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 49 (1971), 1–22; Peter D. Klein, "A Proposed Definition of Propositional Knowledge," *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. LXIII (1971), 471–482; Bredo C. Johnsen, "Knowledge," *Philosophical Studies*, Vol. XXV (1974), 273–282; John L. Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974); Keith Lehrer, *Knowledge* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1974); Marshall Swain, "Epistemic Defeasibility," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, XI (1974), 15-2; and Ernest Sosa, "How Do You Know?" *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. XI (1974), pp. 113–122. Some of the classic attempts are published in Michael D. Roth and Leon Galis, *Knowing: Essays in the Analysis of Knowledge* (New York: Random House, 1970). For a detailed survey and examination of these and subsequent attempts to deal with Gettier's problem, see Robert K. Shope, *The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of Research* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).

the second proposition. And therefore it is possible for a true proposition
to make a *false* proposition evident.

The various Gettier cases also have this feature in common: the proposi-
tion involved is made evident by a proposition that makes some *false* propo-
sition evident.[13] Hence they are all cases of what may be said, in the
following sense, to be "defectively evident":

D1   h is defectively evident for S = Df   (1)   There is an e such that e makes
       h evident for S; and (2)   everything that makes h evident for S makes
       something that is false evident for S

The expression, "e makes h evident for h," should, of course, be taken in
the way defined in Chapter 6.[14]

The proposition "Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona" is defec-
tively evident for Smith. It is made evident for S by the proposition e
("Jones has at all times kept a Ford in his garage . . . etc."), and *everything*
that makes e evident for Smith also makes a false proposition evident for
Smith—namely, the proposition that Jones owns a Ford. (In considering
this fact, one should keep in mind what was said in Chapter 6—that no
proposition makes itself evident. Hence "Jones owns a Ford" does *not* make
itself evident.)

Shall we, then, add "h is not defectively evident" as the fourth condition
of our definition of knowledge? This would not be quite enough. For, if we
were to do this, then we would have to say, incorrectly, that Gettier's Smith
does *not* know that e ("Jones has at all times in the past . . . etc.") is true. For
e, like h, is defectively evident by our definition. So we must make the
definition slightly more complicated.

The conjuncts of e (e.g., "Jones keeps a Ford in his garage"), unlike e
itself, are *not* defectively evident. Although in conjunction they make a false
proposition evident, none of them by itself makes a false proposition evi-
dent. This fact suggests the following definition:

D2   h is known by S = Df   (1) h is true; (2) S accepts h; (3) h is evident for S;
       and (4) if h is defectively evident for S, then h is implied by a conjunction
       of propositions each of which is evident for S but not defectively evident
       for S

[13]This general diagnosis of the problem is also suggested by: Keith Lehrer, in "Self-Profile"
(pp. 91–96) in Radu J. Bogdan, ed., *Keith Lehrer*; and Ernest Sosa, in *"Presuppositions of
Empirical Knowledge," Philosophical Papers*, Vol. XV (1986), pp. 75–88.

[14]Give n an analysis (which, unfortunately, we do not have) of what is meant by "S accepts h
for the wrong reasons," we could add a further condition to our definiens and say that S does
not accept h "for the wrong reasons." As we shall see, however, it is not clear that such a
stipulation is required for defining what it is to *know*—as distinguished from what it is to have
insight into what one knows.

We have, then, a proposed solution to Gettier's complication of the problem of the *Theaetetus*. The solution is not simple, but it is much more simple than many of its alternatives. And, like those alternatives we have criticized, our definition has the virtue that, if it *is* wrong, then one can show precisely at what point an error was made.[15]

KNOWING THAT ONE KNOWS

Does knowing include knowing that one knows?

The principle according to which *knowing* that h includes *knowing that one knows* that h is one that Hintikka has appropriately called "the KK principle" and it has been affirmed by many philosophers.[16] Thus Schopenhauer said:

Your knowing that you know differs only in words from your knowing. 'I know that I know' means nothing more than 'I know,' . . . If your knowing and your knowing that you know are two different things, just try to separate them, and first to know without knowing that you know, then to know that you know without this knowledge being at the same time knowing.[17]

Is the KK principle true?

If I know that I know a certain proposition h, then it is *evident to me that h is evident* to me.[18] Shall we say, then, that if a proposition is evident, then it is also evident that it is evident? Or that, if a proposition is evident, then it is evident that it is known?

A proposition cannot be evident to a person unless the person understands the proposition. Now it is possible that there is a person who does not yet have the concept of evidence or of knowledge, but for whom, all the same, a certain proposition is known. Such a person, then, would be one for whom it would not be evident that anything is known or evident. Therefore a proposition may be evident without it being evident that it is

[15]I am indebted to many philosophers for criticisms of earlier versions of this solution. Of these philosophers, Earl Conee deserves special mention.

[16]Jaakko Hintikka, *Knowledge and Belief* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962); Hintikka also affirms a version of this principle. Compare: E. J. Lemmon, "If I Know, Do I Know That I Know?", in Avrum Stroll, ed., *Epistemology: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 54–82; Carl Ginet, "What Must be Added to Knowing to Obtain Knowing that One Knows," *Synthese*, Vol. XXI (1970), 163–186; and Risto Hilpinen, "Knowing that One Knows and the Classical Definition of Knowledge," *Synthese*," Vol. XXI (1970), 109–132.

[17]Arthur Schopenhauer, *The Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reason* (London: George Bell and Sons, 1897), Section 41, 166.

[18]Compare John Pollock: "Whenever *h* is evident for a person, then it is also evident for him that he knows *h*." From "Chisholm's Definition of Knowledge," *Philosophical Studies*, XIX (1968), 72–76; the quotation is on p. 74.

evident, and a proposition may be known without it being known that it is known.[19]

We should not say, then, that knowing implies knowing that one knows. Shall we say instead that, if a proposition is evident, and that if one asks oneself whether it is evident, *then* it is evident that the proposition is evident?[20] This is less objectionable, for one cannot ask oneself such a question unless one *does* have the concept of a proposition being evident. In Chapter 3, however, we set forth a simpler principle—what we there called "the *objectivity* principle." The objectivity principle tells us that, if a person knows a given proposition to be true, and if he also *believes* that he knows that proposition to be true, then he *knows that he knows* that proposition to be true.[21]

You may have knowledge, then, without having any *insight* into the epistemic status of what you know. In other words, you may know a proposition h to be true without having any beliefs at all about the fact that h is evident or about what makes h evident for you. You will have *some* degree of insight into your knowledge of h if you have a true belief about what makes h evident for you. You will have a greater degree of insight if, moreover, you have no *false* belief to the effect that some *other* proposition makes h evident for you. And you will have an even greater degree of insight into the status of your knowledge of h, if you also *know* that e makes h evident for you.[22] But our ordinary knowledge about such things as ships, trees, and houses does not require that we have any beliefs about our epistemic situation.

[19]This point is made by Arthur Danto in "On Knowing that we Know," In Avrum Stroll, ed., *Epistemology: New Essays in the Theory of Knowledge* (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 32–53. But contrast Brentano, who held that the fact that a proposition is evident for a person S is sufficient to give S the concept of a proposition being evident; see *The True and the Evident* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), p. 125.

[20]This principle is suggested by H. A. Prichard: ". . . whenever we know something, we either do, or at least can, by reflecting, directly know that we are knowing." H. A. Prichard, *Knowledge and Perception* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1950), 86.

[21]See Richard Feldman, "Knowing that One Knows," *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XC (1981), pp. 266–282. I am indebted to Feldman for helping me to become clearer about this problem.

[22]See the discussion of "*doxastic warrant*" in Roderick Firth, "Are Epistemic Concepts Reducible to Ethical Concepts?" in A. I. Goldman and J. Kim, eds., *Values and Morals* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978) pp. 215–230; see p. 218ff. Compare Robert Audi in "The Causal Structure of Indirect Justification," *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXX (1983), pp. 398–495; and John Pollock, *Contemporary Theories of Knowledge*, (Totowa, NJ: Bowman & Littlefield, 1986), p. 81.